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Abstract
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the
Banco Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily re￿ect those of the Banco Central do Brasil.
We study optimal monetary policy when inequality is present by introduc-
ing agents with di⁄erent productivities, wages, and ￿nancial market accesses
into a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Our main results are:
(i) There is a channel from interest rate to in￿ ation throughout inequality;
(ii) The welfare-based objective of monetary policy includes inequality sta-
bilization; (iii) Higher levels of ￿nancial exclusion are associated to bigger
welfare losses and to smaller interest rate variability, providing an alternative
explanation to why observed interest rate paths are much less volatile than
optimal policies implied by most theoretical models of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism.
JEL Classi￿cation: E31; E32; E52
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Does inequality cause in￿ ation? Is in￿ ation bad for inequality? What are the links
between in￿ ation, inequality, and monetary policy? This paper o⁄ers a model for
the joint determination of output, interest rate, in￿ ation, and inequality that weaves
together these classical questions studied by the empirical literature.1
We incorporate inequality by introducing two types of agents with di⁄erent pro-
ductivities, wages, and ￿nancial market accesses. While some households can hold
assets and smooth consumption over time, others cannot hold assets and thus can-
not react to interest rate changes. In this context, inequality, evaluated through an
index built on the consumption of the two types of agents, becomes a straightfor-
ward channel between monetary policy and in￿ ation. In choosing a consumption
based inequality index, we move beyond income as an indicator of well-being, in line
with Krueger and Perri (2006).2
Our model contrasts with the current theoretical literature for explicitly incor-
porating inequality in the structural equations of an otherwise standard New Key-
nesian framework. Besides a slope-modi￿ed intertemporal IS curve we derive both
an intertemporal inequality curve and an "inequality augmented" Phillips curve.
Inequality is also present in the welfare-based loss function of the monetary author-
ity. Under this "inequality expanded" objective, an optimal monetary policy can
no longer simultaneously stabilize the output gap and in￿ ation since it has to take
the e⁄ects of inequality into consideration, even when inequality has no impact on
in￿ ation.
We also calibrate the model with standard parameters values to show that the
optimal policy implies that the variance of interest rate decreases with ￿nancial
exclusion, although the welfare loss increases. This is a new explanation to why
observed interest rate paths are much less volatile than optimal policies implied by
most existing macroeconomic frameworks, as pointed out by Clarida et al. (1999).
Finally, we explore the e⁄ects of policy shocks on the economy under an optimal
1Next section brie￿ y presents the empirical literature.
2The authors argue that current income may not be the appropriate measure of lifetime resources
available to agents since a signi￿cant fraction of variations of income are due to variations in its
transitory component.
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 commitment policy for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial exclusion. After a monetary
shock, higher levels of ￿nancial exclusion are associated to higher inequality and
lower output gap, in￿ ation, and the interest rate. After a ￿scal shock, in￿ ation
and inequality drop with ￿nancial exclusion, while the output gap and interest rate
increase.
The next section brie￿ y describes the literature that links monetary policy, in-
￿ ation and inequality. Section 3 introduces the model while section 4 presents its
log-linear version. Section 5 deals with analyzes of the optimal monetary policy.
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 Brief literature review
2.1 Empirical evidence
On the one hand, there is extensive empirical literature about the in￿ uence of in￿ a-
tion and monetary policy on inequality. For example, both Romer and Romer (1999)
and Easterly and Fischer (2001) point out that in￿ ation hurts the poor. While the
former ￿nds a strong positive relation between in￿ ation and inequality, the latter
￿nds that direct measures of improvement in the well-being of the poor and in￿ ation
are negatively correlated in pooled cross-country regressions. They also present, us-
ing household level polling data for 38 countries, that the poor rather than the rich
are more likely to mention in￿ ation as a top national concern.
On the other hand, few empirical studies focus on the in￿ uence of inequality
on in￿ ation. For instance, Al-Marhubi (1997) performs OLS regressions of mean
in￿ ation on income inequality and ￿nds that countries with greater inequality have
higher mean in￿ ation, even after accounting for the level of openness, political in-
stability, and central bank independence. Dolmas et al. (2000) also run OLS regres-
sions and document a positive correlation between income inequality and in￿ ation
in democracies, in contrast to what occurs in non-democracies.
2.2 New Keynesian literature
On the theoretical side, most of the work on monetary policy is based on a frame-
work that assumes the existence of a representative household, which is clearly
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 inadequate to evaluate inequality.3 Some authors incorporate heterogeneous agents
in this framework. Gal￿ et al. (2004) introduce rule-of-thumb consumers in a con-
ventional New Keynesian model with investment to show how their presence can
dramatically change the properties of widely used interest rate rules. Bilbiie (2005)
uses a similar framework, but in contrast to Gal￿ et al. (2004) he abstracts from
capital accumulation and focuses on a di⁄erent set of questions, speci￿cally how the
presence of non-asset holders alters the slope of the IS curve, the determinacy prop-
erties of interest rate rules, optimal monetary policy and the response of the model
to shocks. Muscatelli et al. (2005) and Landon-Lane and Occhino (2005) use US
data to estimate models with liquidity constrained consumers and ￿nd a signi￿cant
role for rule-of-thumb consumer behavior.
In the next section we explicitly incorporate inequality in the structural equations
of the New Keynesian textbook model in order to provide uni￿ed treatment for the
mutual in￿ uence between in￿ ation and inequality presented by the empirical litera-
ture. Our model contrasts with the current theoretical literature for incorporating
di⁄erent productivities and wages as two other sources of inequality between con-
sumers apart from ￿nancial market access. This modi￿cation a⁄ects the structural
equations of the model, the monetary policy objective and introduces a dynamic
inequality curve.
3 The model
The economy consists of households, ￿rms, and the government. We use a modi-
￿ed version of the model presented in Gal￿ et al. (2004) to analyze the e⁄ects of
inequality on monetary policy. We read their rule-of-thumb consumers as agents
excluded from the ￿nancial market. On the one hand, we simplify their model by
ignoring investment, as in Bilbiie (2005). On the other hand, we incorporate di⁄er-
ent productivities and wages as two other sources of inequality between consumers
apart from ￿nancial market access. We intend to account for inequality e⁄ects while
keeping the model as close as possible to the standard New Keynesian framework.
We explicitly assume that money only plays the role of a unit of account. Money
does not appear in either the budget constraint or utility function. Throughout, we
3See Clarida et al. (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997), and Woodford (2003b).
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 specify monetary policy in terms of an interest rate rule; hence, we do not need to
introduce money explicitly in the model.
3.1 Households
We assume a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households indexed in the unit interval.
An exogenous fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of households - so forth called ￿nancially excluded
(FE) agents - do not own any assets. The remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of households -
the ￿nancially included (FI) agents - has access to ￿nancial markets. We use letters
￿e￿and ￿i￿to index variables associated to FE and FI consumers.






















; k 2 fe;ig; (1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 denotes the discount factor, Ck
t is an index of consumption goods
and Hk
t is the number of hours worked at period t.4
Type k households o⁄er labor in a perfectly competitive market with fully ￿ exible
wages. They also purchase di⁄erentiated goods in a retail market and combine them

















; ￿ > 1; (2)
where Ck
t (z) is the demand for di⁄erentiated goods of type z. Type k household
minimizes the total cost of obtaining di⁄erentiated goods indexed by a unit interval
[0;1], taking as given their nominal prices Pt (z). Cost-minimization then gives a
demand curve of the form:
C
k








where the aggregate price level Pt is de￿ned to be















3.1.1 Financially included consumer
In each period t = 0, 1, 2,:::, the FI household chooses decision rules for consumption
Ci
t, labor Hi
t, and nominal bonds portfolio Bt+1 to maximize (1) subject to a sequence
of period budget constraints that must hold with equality in equilibrium:











where Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for computing the nominal value at
period t of one unit of consumption goods at period t + 1, W i
t is the nominal wage
rate for FI households, ￿i
t denotes nominal dividend income, and T i
t represents the
nominal value of (net) lump-sum taxes.
The following ￿rst order conditions must hold in equilibrium with a positive
risk-free nominal rate of interest at period t, it:

























regarding the fact that Et fQt;t+1g = (1 + it)
￿1.
3.1.2 Financially excluded consumer
Households from this group are excluded from ￿nancial markets and consequently










t is the nominal wage rate for FE households. People excluded from the
￿nancial system are also unable to buy stocks and receive di⁄erentiated treatment
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 from the government. As a result, only FI consumers receive dividends and pay
lump-sum taxes.
As equation (6) holds with equality in equilibrium, FE agents just consume their





















Monopolistically competitive ￿rms indexed in the unit interval characterize the
goods market. Each ￿rm z produces a di⁄erentiated good z using Cobb-Douglas
technology:








where Yt (z) denotes the level of output at period t of ￿rm z while He
t (z) and Hi
t (z)
are the total number of working hours hired from each type of agent by this ￿rm.
The variable At > 0 is an exogenous technology factor while q 2 (0;1) and 1￿q are
the productivity factors associated with each type of agent.
Market clearing imposes Yt (z) = ￿Ce
t (z) + (1 ￿ ￿)Ci
t (z) + Gt (z), where Gt (z)
represents governmental demand for the good produced by ￿rm z. We assume that
government purchases an aggregate Gt of form (2) of all goods in the economy, and
thus the government￿ s demand for each good z is given by a demand curve analogous
to (3). Thereafter, we obtain the following demand curve for each good z:






where Yt ￿ Ct+Gt ￿ ￿Ce
t +(1 ￿ ￿)Ci
t +Gt is a composite index analogous to those
speci￿ed in (2) that denotes aggregate demand.
Since the minimum cost criterion is given by W e
t He
t (z)=q = W i
tHi
t (z)=(1 ￿ q),
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dz is a dis-
persion measure for prices.


















The marginal cost does not depend on the output level of an individual ￿rm, as
long as its production function exhibits constant returns to scale and input prices
are fully ￿ exible in perfectly competitive markets.
3.2.1 Flexible-price equilibrium








where ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 > 1 is the desired markup of the ￿rm. The subsidy for output
0 ￿ ￿ < 1 o⁄sets the e⁄ect on imperfect competition in the goods markets on
the steady state level of output.5 We combine (12) with (5) and (7) to write the

























(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿+!
￿1￿q
5See Woodford (2003b) for details.
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Finally, we combine equations (13) and (14) to show that relative prices depend














We use an alternative de￿nition of potential output in order to make our work
more directly comparable with the existing literature. Thereafter, potential output,
Y
f
t , de￿ned as the output that would prevail under ￿ exible wages and prices and
under equal consumption, i.e. Ce
t = Ci
t, given current real factors (tastes, technology,

















Inequality decreases the potential output Y
f
t since ￿(￿) > 1. Furthermore, if
there is an excess of unquali￿ed people (hereafter ￿ > q), Y
f
t decreases with ￿:
Condition ￿ > q re￿ ects that there are more unquali￿ed people than ￿rms are
willing to hire, increasing their costs. In our model, it is not possible to change
the percentage of FE consumers without changing the percentage of less quali￿ed
people. This explains why condition ￿ > q links these two apparently distinct
characteristics.






where ￿ A = 1 and ￿ C = ￿ Y .6 Expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the





￿ ^ Gt + (1 + !) ^ At
! + ￿
; (17)
6The choice of ￿ G = 0 has been made just to simplify calculations. We would obtain similar
dynamics for ￿scal and monetary shocks if we had assumed ￿ G 6= 0.
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 which is the same expression for the natural rate of output in the standard New
Keynesian framework, being ^ zt ￿ (zt ￿ ￿ z)=￿ z for all variables zt, except for ^ Gt ￿
Gt=￿ Y .
4 Dynamic equilibrium
We derive the log-linear version of the model around a steady state with zero in￿ a-
tion, equal consumption for all agents, and without government spending
￿ ￿ Ce = ￿ Ci = ￿ C = ￿ Y
￿
to analyze the transition dynamics. In order to allow for real e⁄ects of monetary
policy, ￿rms set prices as in the sticky price model of Calvo (1983). Speci￿cally,
during each period a fraction ￿ of ￿rms are not allowed to change prices, whereas
the other fraction, 1 ￿ ￿, do change.
4.1 IS curve
The demand side of the model is represented by an intertemporal IS equation. The










￿1 [^ {t ￿ Et f￿t+1g]; (18)



















where we write W e
t =W i
t in terms of ￿t.7
Finally, the log-linearization of (15) yields:
^ ￿t = ^ C
e
t ￿ ^ Ct: (20)
De￿ning xt ￿ ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y
f
t as our output gap measure and using equations (18) to
(20), we obtain the following IS curve:
xt = Et fxt+1g ￿ ’
h










































 where ’ ￿ ￿￿￿1 and ￿ ￿ 1 +
￿(!+￿)
1￿q￿￿￿(1+!). The real interest rate that stabilizes the
output gap, r
f




















^ Gt+1 ￿ ^ Gt
o￿
:
As in Bilbiie (2005), our model predicts that when ￿nancial exclusion change
from high to low the slope of the IS curve changes from positive ("non-Keynesian")
to negative. Note, however, that ￿ also varies with q. If ￿ > 1, the impact of the
interest rate on the output gap is more intense than in the standard New Keynesian
model. We show in panel (A) of ￿gure 1 that, considering only Keynesian values, ￿
increases with ￿.
4.2 Inequality evolution






(￿ + !)xt + ^ Gt
i
; (22)




. We choose the Gini index for consumption, given by gt = ￿￿^ ￿t,
as the inequality variable of our economy.8
The evolution of the Gini index, obtained from the substitution of (22) in the
IS curve and the replacement of ^ ￿t for gt, gives us an intuitive way of seeing how
monetary policy a⁄ects inequality:
gt = Et fgt+1g + ’
￿ ￿





where ’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1, ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1) and r￿
t, the real interest rate that stabilizes










^ Gt+1 ￿ ^ Gt
o
:
8Normalizing Ct to unity (or 100 percent of consumption) and imposing that Ce
t < Ci
t, we
obtain gt = ￿￿^ ￿t. If Ce
t > Ci
t, we ￿nd that gt = ￿^ ￿t. Thereafter, the Gini index is given by ￿
￿ ￿￿^ ￿t
￿
￿ ￿, which assumes only positive values as a measure. In this context, it does not matter for the
Gini index that agent consumes more, but only how di⁄erent their consumption is. In the present
work, we will de￿ne gt = ￿￿^ ￿t. Although this variable is not a measure, the sign helps to identify
which agents are increasing their consumption. "Inequality increases" means that FE agents are
reducing their consumption.
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 If ￿ > 1, inequality rises with the interest rate. The di⁄erence between the real
interest rates that stabilize the output gap and the Gini index is solely based on
the evolution of government spending. Panel (A) of ￿gure 1 shows that ￿￿ increases
with ￿, being always smaller than ￿.
4.3 New Keynesian Phillips curve
The Calvo (1983) model leads to an aggregate supply relation of the form:
￿t = ￿ d MCt + ￿Et f￿t+1g; (24)
where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿ > 0 and d MCt is the percent variation of real marginal
costs.
Considering (17), a log-linearization of the real marginal costs expressed in (14)
yields:




The ￿rst component is standard but now with a di⁄erent interpretation. Mar-
ginal costs are proportional to the output gap that would occur if consumption of
both agents were equal. The second term corrects this measure by the inequality
e⁄ect. We can use this equation and (24) to obtain our New Keynesian Phillips
curve (NKPC)
￿t = ￿xt + ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿
￿gt; (25)
where ￿ ￿ ￿ (! + ￿) and ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿.
From (22) and (25) the NKPC can be written in a more familiar format
￿t = ￿
￿xt + ￿Et f￿t+1g + ut; (26)












Equation (23), which shows how monetary policy a⁄ects inequality, together
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 with equation (25), the inequality augmented NKPC, lead to our ￿rst result:
Conclusion 1 (Inequality channel) There is a channel from interest rate to in-
￿ation throughout inequality when ￿ 6= q. If there is an excess of unquali￿ed








decreases with ￿nancial exclusion (￿). Alternatively, if ￿ > q,
the output-in￿ation trade-o⁄ is higher than in the standard New Keynesian model
(￿￿ < ￿). In addition, a shock ut arises as a function of the share of government













5 Optimal monetary policy
The policymaker maximizes the average expected utility of households. Following
Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003b), we obtain our policy objective function



















where tip denotes terms independent of the actual policy such as constants and
terms involving only exogenous variables while Lt is given by:
Lt ￿ ￿xx
2





where ￿x, ￿￿ and ￿￿ are functions of the structural parameters of the model and
￿x + ￿￿ + ￿￿ = 1.9 Thereafter, we have:
9Speci￿cally, ￿x ￿ ￿
￿; ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿; ￿￿ ￿ ￿
















 Conclusion 2 (Inequality objective) The objective of a monetary policy con-
sistent with welfare maximization includes inequality stabilization (g2
t), as well as







. Furthermore, the relative impor-
tance of g2
t on loss function Lt decreases as ￿ ! 1=2, meaning that when the two
groups are equally represented, central banks should pay relatively less attention to
inequality variations and direct their policy concerns to the evolution of in￿ation
and output gap.
This result is in line with Fowler (2005) that ￿nds empirical evidence that a Gini
based monetary feedback rule is compatible with several features of the US economy.
The maximization of (27) subject to the constraints represented by the NKPC in
(25) and the equation that governs the dynamics of gt in (22) generates the following
criterion under commitment:












This so-called optimal target criterion represents a policy rule that is optimal
from a timeless perspective following Giannoni and Woodford (2005). In￿ ation
should be accepted as long as it is negatively proportional to output gap variations
corrected by inequality variations over the same period.
It is not optimal to maintain zero in￿ ation and a zero output gap in the face
of inequality variations. If ￿ > q, the coe¢ cient on xt in ￿rst order condition
￿(￿￿￿)
￿1 = (1 + ￿)￿
￿1 is greater than standard value ￿
￿1. In this context, optimal
policy results in greater in￿ ation variability for a given level of output gap variability
when inequality is present.
Intuitively, stabilizing in￿ ation has become more costly when ￿ > q. As ^ {t
increases, xt decreases, and this serves to reduce in￿ ation, but the direct e⁄ect in
gt of the rise in the nominal interest rate partly o⁄sets the de￿ ationary impact of a
tighter monetary policy. Because it is more costly (in terms of the output gap) to
control in￿ ation, equilibrium in￿ ation variability will be higher.
In order to implement the target rule, we obtain an optimal instrument rule by
substituting equations (21), (23), and (25) in the optimal criterion (29):
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 ^ {t = ￿￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿xEt fxt+1g + ￿￿Et fgt+1g + ￿x￿1xt￿1 + ￿￿￿1gt￿1 + ￿t; (30)
where the ￿
0
js are functions of the structural parameters of the model while com-







which is the weight average between the natural rate of interest and the real interest
rate that stabilizes gt.10
We call equation (30) our expectations-based reaction function following Evans
and Honkapohja (2006). If the monetary authority commits itself to set interest rates
in accordance with this reaction function at all times, then the rational-expectations
equilibrium is necessarily determinate.11
6 Implications for welfare and transition dynamics
To illustrate not only the impact on welfare but also the response to monetary and
￿scal shocks under optimal commitment, we calibrate the model represented by
equations (21), (23), (25), and (30) and solve it numerically.
6.1 Calibration
The model￿ s structural parameters are ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, !, q and ￿. The baseline values we
use, shown in table 1, are standard and based on Giannoni and Woodford (2005).
Since we intend to keep the model as close as possible to the standard New Keynesian
framework, we will not consider calibrations that generates "non-Keynesian" e⁄ects,
e.g. a IS curve with a positive slope or a inverted Taylor principle.
We set ￿ = 0:9 in order to obtain in our baseline case (￿ = q) the value of
10The coe¢ cients are ￿￿ ￿ 1 +
￿￿
￿￿
￿ , ￿x ￿ ￿1
￿ , ￿x￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿2






















11Note that we can substitute (22) in (30) to obtain a model similar to Woodford (2003b). When
￿ > q and ￿ > 1, the relevant signals of our model are analogous to the ones presented in Woodford
(2003b, page 530), and so the result immediately applies.
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 ’ = 1:60, which is very similar to the value obtained for Giannoni and Woodford
(2005) for their equivalent parameter ’￿1. The discount factor ￿ is set equal to 0:99,
appropriate for interpreting the time interval as one quarter. The value of 0:66 for
￿ is consistent with an average lifetime of price contracts of three quarters. A value
of 11 for ￿ implies a steady state markup of 1:1. Because the focus of this article
is on exploring the e⁄ects of inequality, results are reported for several values of ￿.
Based on surveyed evidence around the world, we restrict attention to the values
of ￿nancial inclusion below 0.4.12 The value of q just matter in comparison with ￿
(q ? ￿) but does not a⁄ect the results quantitatively. We set q to 0:1 in order to
obtain ￿ ￿ q and, in turn, ￿ W e ￿ ￿ W i and ￿￿ ￿ 0 (or equivalently, ￿￿ < ￿).
Parameter Description Value
￿ Fraction of ￿rms that leave their prices unchanged 0:66
￿ Time discount factor 0:99
￿ Elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated goods 11
￿ Level of ￿nancial exclusion (0;0:4]
￿ Risk aversion parameter 0:90
! Inverse of elasticity of labor supply 0:33
q FE productivity 0:10
￿g ￿scal shock inertia 0:90
Table 1: Baseline calibration
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the main composite parameters of the model.
6.2 Welfare analysis
Taking the unconditional expectation of (27) to abstract from initial conditions, we





￿ ￿xV [xt] + ￿￿V [^ ￿t] + ￿￿V [gt];
where, for any variable zt, we have the weight ￿z ￿ ￿￿z, and where the measure of
variability is de￿ned by
12Aizcorbe et al. (2003) pointed out that 90.9 percent of US families had some type of transaction
account in 2001. Accordingly to FSA (2000), 7 percent of households in Britain lack any ￿nancial
products at all.
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(A) Interest rate impact on output and Gini











(B) Output and Gini impacts on inflation












































Figure 1: Financial exclusion and inequality e⁄ects under baseline calibration of table 1.











which, except for discounting, corresponds to the unconditional variance of zt. We
include ￿ in the calculation of ^ E [L0] to analyze how welfare evolves with ￿. It is
important to remember that ￿x, ￿￿ and ￿￿ have been normalized to sum one. There-
fore, the graph in panel (D) of ￿gure 1 describes how in￿ ation becomes relatively
more important as ￿ grows. Without this normalization, ￿￿, and ￿x do not vary
with ￿, in contrast to ￿￿ that decreases.13
Under the optimal plan, higher levels of ￿nancial exclusion are associated to
bigger welfare losses. The impact of the interest rate on inequality, ￿, and output
gap, ￿￿, increases with ￿. See panel (A) of ￿gure 1. At the same time, in￿ ation
stabilization becomes more costly, since nominal interest rate generates opposite
impacts on gt and xt. As a result, the equilibrium variability of ￿t, xt, and gt is
13Under our baseline calibration, ￿￿ = 11 and ￿x = 0:2963. The value of ￿￿ ￿ 1 when ￿ = 0:4
and ￿￿ ! 1 when ￿ ! 0.
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Figure 2: Welfare loss and interest rate variability.
higher.
Note, however, that interest rate variability decreases with ￿nancial exclusion.
This leads to our ￿nal result:
Conclusion 3 (E¢ cient frontier) An e¢ cient frontier emerges from the fact that
welfare loss and interest rate variability evolve in opposite ways with ￿nancial ex-
clusion under the optimal plan.
Figure 2 presents the e¢ cient frontier.
In our model, interest rate volatility is avoided because of its direct impact on
inequality, which increases with ￿. This is a new explanation to why observed inter-
est rate paths are much less volatile than optimal policies implied by most existing
macroeconomic frameworks, as pointed out by Clarida et al. (1999). Some of the
arguments that have been proposed to explain this behavior include uncertainty
about the data (Orphanides (2001)), model uncertainty (Brainard (1967)), the zero
bound on nominal interest rates non-binding (Woodford (2003a)), and the fear of
disruption of ￿nancial markets.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a monetary shock under optimal commitment under
alternative levels of ￿nancial exclusion - main variables.
6.3 Optimal response to policy disturbances
6.3.1 Monetary shocks
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to a monetary
shock under an optimal commitment policy. The di⁄erent lines are indexed by ￿.
The introduction of an inequality channel does not a⁄ect the basic response
pattern. For all values of ￿, a monetary shock contracts the output gap and increases




, since interest rates rise above
both their natural rate r
f
t and the natural rate of inequality r￿
t. These movements
generate opposite impacts on in￿ ation. Nevertheless, since persistently negative
future output gaps compensate for in￿ ationary pressure generated by the increase
in inequality, in￿ ation falls. As ￿ increases, all these dynamics are ampli￿ed, the
initial responses of the output gap and in￿ ation are lower, and the Gini response
is higher. Since the optimal interest rule considers inequality, the nominal interest
rate rises less under this policy.
From the point of view of the agents￿decisions, FI agents postpone their con-
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a ￿scal shock under optimal commitment under alternative
levels of ￿nancial exclusion - main variables.
sumption in response to an interest rate increase induced by the monetary shock.
Market clearing forces ￿rms to reduce their production and, consequently, the de-
mand for labor and wages paid for both agents. Since FE agents direct all their
current labor income to consumption, any reduction in wages and working hours
will drive them to reduce their consumption as well.
When ￿ > 1, FE consumption and wages, expressed in terms of percentage
deviations around the steady state, are more volatile than FI consumption and
wages, while the opposite is true regarding hours. It happens because FE consumers
are less susceptible to cuts in their wages since they only consume if they work.
6.3.2 Fiscal shocks
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to a ￿scal
shock under an optimal commitment policy. The di⁄erent lines are indexed by ￿.
Under a ￿scal shock, r
f
t 6= r￿
t. As a result, the central bank becomes unable
to stabilize inequality and output gap with just one instrument ￿the interest rate.
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 Since both variables impact in￿ ation, maintaining a zero output gap is not enough
to keep in￿ ation at zero. Even when inequality has no in￿ uence on in￿ ation (￿ = q),
the optimal policy that reduces ￿ uctuations in welfare allows both in￿ ation and the
output gap to deviate from zero. When ￿ > q the presence of the Gini index on the
Phillips curve a⁄ects in￿ ation similarly to the introduction of a cost channel as in
Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
This dynamics contrasts with the one presented by the standard textbook New
Keynesian model, when monetary authorities face no trade-o⁄ between stabilizing
in￿ ation and output gap, being able to perfectly o⁄set the impact of a ￿scal shock.
As ￿gure 4 shows, the monetary authority responds to a ￿scal shock with an
increase in the interest rate. As the interest rate rises less than r￿
t, inequality drops.
The impact on the output gap depends on the value of ￿. For bigger values of
￿, the rise in r
f
t more than compensates for monetary tightening, increasing the
output gap, while the opposite occurs for small values of ￿. The in￿ ation dynamics
is initially dominated by the Gini index, while the in￿ uence of the output gap is
noticeable on the overshooting that occurs.
After the ￿scal shock, the resulting interest rate increase induces FI agents to
postpone their consumption. However, government spending more than compen-
sates for this decline in consumption, forcing ￿rms to increase their production and,
consequently, the demand for labor. Nevertheless, as FI agents are not so anxious
for consumption, they are willing to accept smaller wages for the same amount of
work. Thereafter, their real wages fall, even with an increase in working hours. On
the other hand, FE agents do not respond to the resulting interest rate increase and
thereby require higher real wages to work more. Since FE agents direct all their
current labor income to consumption, any increase in wages and working hours will
drive them to increase their consumption as well.
7 Conclusions
We have incorporated inequality into the standard New Keynesian framework by
introducing two types of agents with di⁄erent productivities, wages, and ￿nancial
market accesses. In our model, inequality, evaluated through an index built on the
consumption of the two types of agents, a⁄ects both structural equations and the
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 monetary policy objective.
We show that monetary policy in￿ uences both output gap and inequality, which
in turn a⁄ect in￿ ation. Furthermore, we derive a welfare-based loss function for the
monetary authority that encompasses not only in￿ ation and output gap but also
inequality variations.
We also show that welfare losses and interest rate variability under the optimal
plan evolve in opposite directions with ￿nancial exclusion. Finally, we show how
di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial exclusion a⁄ect both welfare and the dynamic responses
of the model after ￿scal and monetary shocks.
As part of future research associated with the present paper, we plan to conduct
a quantitative analysis of the joint evolution of nominal interest rates and inequality
in several countries. Finally, it would also be relevant to explore how social plans,
such as investments in education or minimum-wage policies, a⁄ect both inequality
and the monetary policy. Nevertheless, additional investigation into this "social-
macro dynamics" requires a uni￿ed theoretical framework that encompasses both
social and economic policies. This model is just a ￿rst step in this direction.
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